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Legal Nature of Federal and Provincial
Executive Governments: Some Comments
on Transactions between them
DAVID W. MUNDELL*
The purpose of this article is purely explanatory-to explain the
legal nature and operation of the so-called "executive" governments,
both federal and provincial, with a view to discussing the legal nature
of transactions and more particularly agreements between them. By
"executive governments" are meant the apparatuses of the federal
and of the provincial governments existing apart from Parliament
and the legislatures and apart from the courts and their judicial
machinery. Section 9 of the British North America Act, 1867, pro-
Vides:
The Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby
declared to continue and be vested in the Queen.
This provision clearly placed Her Majesty at the head of the federal
government. Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v. The Queen,' held
that Her Majesty was also the head of the provincial governments.
The Bonanza Creek case2 indicated that, where no express provision
is made in the Act, the distribution of "executive authority" under
the B.N.A. Act in substance follows the distribution of legislative
powers. An understanding of the legal content of the executive
branch of government existing apart from the B.N.A. Act is there-
fore necessary to apply the B.N.A. Act and the decisions.
Such an understanding is also needed to appreciate the legal
nature of transactions between the federal government and provincial
governments or between provincial governments. The peculiarity of
the legal relations between these governments rests on the so-called
doctrine of the "indivisibility of the Crown". From a legal point of
view neither the Government of Canada nor of any province has any
existence as a legal entity. Each government is merely the practical
apparatus through which Her Majesty as the head of both govern-
ments and as the owner of all public property, the employer of all
public servants and the superior of all executive officers, carries on
her business. The simplest illustration of the problems is in the field
of contract. Basic legal doctrine prescribes that no person can con-
*Professor D. W. Mundell, Q.C., B.A., LL.B. (Sask.), B.C.L. (Oxon.), of the
Bar of Saskatchewan, and of Osgoode Hall, Barrister-atlaw, is a member
of the faculty at the Osgoode Hall Law School.1 [1892] A.C. 437.
2 [1916J 1 A.C. 566, at 529.
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tract with himself. Her Majesty, acting as head of one government,
cannot, according to orthodox legal theory, contract with herself as
the head of another government. We are, however, accustomed to
agreements of all kinds being made between the so-called govern-
ments. Similar questions arise with respect to the transfer of property
from one government to another. What is the legal operation of
these transactions?
In this discussion the term "Crown" will not be used and refer-
ence will be made throughout to Her Majesty or to the sovereign-in
the sense of the reigning monarch and not in any Austinian sense. As
Maitland pointed out many years ago the use of the term "Crown"
leads to confusion. As he says, the Crown does nothing but lie in the
Tower of London to be gazed at by sightseers and has no legal
existence.3 The use of the term tends to obscure the fact that the
sovereign is a person for legal purposes. For example, continual
references to the Crown and not to "Her Majesty" eventually led
to an even more obscure creation, namely, the "emanation of the
Crown". This term was applied to statutory bodies and corporations
that in some way acted in Her Majesty's business. In International
Railway Co. v. Niagara Parks Commission4 the Privy Council rejected
the expression pointing out that the correct legal description of
such a subordinate, whether an individual or a corporation, is the
ordinary legal classification of "agent" or "servant" of Her Majesty.
If the expression "Her Majesty" had been used throughout instead
of the expression "Crown", the terminology of agent or servant with
known and defined legal attributes would have been recognized as
correct from the outset and no such esoteric fabrication as an "ema-
nation of the Crown" with undefined status leading to uncertainties
and misunderstandings would have been developed.
The expression, "indivisibility of the Crown", is a further
example. It is merely a statement that Her Majesty is the same legal
person at the head of all her governments. Criticism has deen directed
at this so-called doctrine. This criticism, which seems to be mis-
directed and to arise from confusion resulting from use of the term
"Crown", will be considered later.5 Too much emphasis cannot be
placed on the desirability of recalling that the term "Crown" unvary-
ingly means the legal person who is the reigning sovereign for the
3 The Constitutional History of England, p. 418.
4 [19411 2 All E.R. 436.
5Another example of possible confusion contributed to by use of the
term "Crown" relates to representatives of Her Majesty such as the Governor
General or a Lieutenant Governor. It is sometimes said loosely that such
a representative "is the Crown". The conclusion to be drawn would be that
the officer is a "viceroy" standing in Her Majesty's place. He is strictly
only a representative acting with limited authority and remains in other
respects merely a subject. His legal position must be appraised on this basis.
See Musgrave v. Pulido (1879), 5 App. Cas. 102; Bonanza Creek case, [19161
1 A.C. 566.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
time being.6 The best course, where possible, appears to be to avoid
its use.
Since barbarisms are so much in fashion in the field of public
law it will do no harm to coin two more so long as they are, unlike
so many others, defined. The approach in this article may be said to
be quasi-historical and quasi-analytical. The legal position of Her
Majesty as it stood in general in 1867, apart from the B.N.A. Act,
will be described. The term "quasi" is intended to indicate that the
historical sketch will not be developed chronologically or in full and
that the analytical element will be introduced to an extent only
sufficient to try to point up the nature of Her Majesty's legal position.
Thereafter, consideration will be given to the effect of the B.N.A.
Act on Her Majesty's legal position and to transactions between her
governments.
Legal Position of Her Majesty Apart from the B.N.A. Act
The central core of Her Majesty's legal position at common law
is that Her Majesty is a legal person subject to the law and having
the legal capacities accorded to a legal person by the law.7 She may
be a party to legal relations with her subjects of the same nature
as exist between subject and subject. Adopting in part Hohfeld's
analysis,8 Her Majesty can have claim-duty, power-liability and
liberty-no claim relations with her subjects of the same nature as
those that exist between subjects. It is true that historically, and
possibly theoretically, duties owed by Her Majesty rest on a basis
different from the basis for duties owed by a subject but they "are
in fact recognized. Thus we find Her Majesty owning property,
receiving and disbursing monies, and entering into contracts with
much the same legal position in these respects as a subject.9 Most
significant is that in her multifarious business she has a hierarchy
of agents and servants who act on her behalf or in her service in
the same general way as agents or servants of other persons.
Although this is the basic legal position of Her Majesty-that
she is under the common law-this basic position is subject to an
important qualification. The common law applying to Her Majesty
6 The Interpretation Act (R.S.O. 1950, c. 184 as amended Stats. Ont. 1958,
c. 43) expressly provides in s. 31(j): "Her Majesty", "His Majesty", "TheQueen", "The King", or "the Crown" means the Sovereign of the United
Kingdom. Canada and Her other Realms and Territories and Head of the
Commonwealth." To the same effect see the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1952,
c. 158, as amended by Stats. Can., 1952-53, c. 9. It will thus be seen that the
Royal Title expressly now includes Her Majesty as Queen of Canada. Within
Canada the long accepted terminology to distinguish Her Majesty as head of
each of Her governments is the use of the terms "Her Majesty in right of
Canada" as head of the federal government and "Her Majesty in right of
Ontario" as head of the provincial government, substituting the name of the
province as required. The word "right" has no technical significance.
7 Eastern Trust Company v. Mackenzie Mann, [1915) A.C. 750 at 759.
sFundamental Legal Conceptions, Yale University Press.
9 For an example of Her Majesty held liable in contract under the general
law, see Windsor and Annapolis Ry. Co. v. The Queen (1886), 11 App. Cas.
607.
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is not identical with the general law applying to subjects. She
occupies a special position by reason of the prerogative rules. The
prerogative is a body of common law rules that vary or add to the
general common law rules insofar as they apply to Her Majesty. The
classic definition of the prerogative is given by Blackstone as
follows:
By the word prerogative we usually understand that special pre-
eminence, which the king hath over and above all other persons, and out
of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity.
It signifies, in its etymology (from prae and rogo), sometimes that is
required or demanded before, or in preference to, all others. And hence
it follows, that it must be in its nature singular and eccentrical; that it
can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the king enjoys
alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in
common with any of his subjects: for if once any one prerogative of
the Crown could be held in common with the subject it would cease to
be prerogative any longer. And therefore Finch lays it down as a maxim,
that the prerogative is that law in case of the king, which is law in no
case on the subject.io
The term "prerogative" is sometimes used to describe the whole
common law position of Her Majesty. This is not an accurate use
of the term. The basic position of Her Majesty is that of a person
subject to the general law and the prerogative is limited to the body
of special common law rules applicable to her varying or adding to the
ordinary common law.- Again the term "prerogative" is also some-
times used to mean all the special law relating to Her Majesty,
whether common law or statutory. Dicey appears to use the term in
this sense when he refers to it as the residue of discretionary
authority at any time exercisable by or on behalf of Her Majesty.
Although politically acceptable, this usage is legally inaccurate, as,
strictly speaking, the prerogative applies only to common law rules.
As will be seen, they do not invariably confer discretionery authority.
Prerogative rules are of widely differing nature. The only book
on the subject--'Chitty's Prerogative of the Crown" published in
1820--classifies them under a number of historical headings. This
book presents a sort of Eaton's catalogue of legal notions. No attempt
will be made in this article to discuss them in detail. Some analysis
of their fundamental characteristics is needed, however, to classify
them and for a proper understanding of the legal nature of the
executive branch of government. The following is an attempt to
present a classification of the prerogatives based on the standard
analytical classification of the legal relations between individuals
derived from Htohfeld, with the addition of certain matters not
falling in that analysis.
Prerogative rules fall into two main categories, with one
maverick rule.
1. Rules governing legal relations between Her Majesty and her
subjects of the same essential nature as those that exist between
:o Commentaries, Chitty ed. Vol. 1 180, 239 in original paging.
13Per Lord Parmoor; Attorney-GeneraZ v. De Kayser's Royal Hotel,[1920] A.C. 508 at 571.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
subject and subject. Many of the prerogative rules deal with
claim-duty, power-liability and liberty-no claim relations between
Her Majesty and subjects of the same analytical nature as those
between subject and subject though differing in practical content.
These are of two kinds:
(a) Prerogative rules that relieve Her Majesty of duties or
liabilities to which she as a person would otherwise be
subject under the general common law. The result is an
expansion of Her Majesty's liberty. The prime illustration
is the common law prerogative rule that as a matter of
substantive law Her Majesty is not liable in tort either
personally or vicariously.
(b) Prerogative rules that confer claims or powers on Her
Majesty additional to those to which she would be entitled
as a person under the general common law. An illustration
is the rule entitling Her Majesty to bona vacantia. This
rule is merely a rule of property law under which Her
Majesty in certain events becomes entitled to property that
would otherwise be ownerless. The vestitive facts that
entitle Her Majesty are unusual but the legal relations of
Her Majesty as the owner are of the same character as in
any other branch of the law of property. Another Ilus-
tration is the prerogative rule that Her Majesty is entitled
to priority in the payment of her debts over those payable
to a subject. This is not dissimilar to the priority of one
subject over another subject recognized in certain fields.
2. Rules that confer unusual legal abilities on Her Majesty of a
kind quite different from any possessed by a subject. The term
"abilities" is used as a neutral term to avoid any attempt to
classify their nature at this stage. These are anomalies in
the legal system so far as the legal relations of subject and
subject go. They do not fall into any accepted category. Before
commenting on their possible nature it is suggested that they
may be classified into the following categories on the basis of
their subject matter.
(a) Parliamentary prerogatives. The legal power of Her Majesty
to legislate on the advice and consent of the Houses of
Parliament is the fundamental rule. Many subsidiary rules
include the power to call, prorogue or dissolve parliament.
(b) Judicial prerogatives. Her Majesty is the head of the
judiciary and all court processes are carried on in the
name of Her Majesty. Writs are commands from Her
Majesty to her subjects. Although it is now settled that
Her Majesty has no personal ability to exercise judicial
power, which must be exercised through her judges, she
still retains the prerogative power to establish courts of
common law except where restricted by statute.
[VOL, 2:56
19601 Legal Nature of Federal and Provincial Executive Govts. 61
(c) Prerogative rules relating to external affairs. Her Majesty
is a sovereign legal person for international law and for all
international relations. She enters into treaties, declares
war and peace and does all other things that may be done
between sovereign states.
(d) A large group of miscellaneous prerogative rules. Prob-
ably the most familiar illustration is the rule that Her
Majesty at common law may incorporate companies. By a
simple declaration, evidenced in writing by letters made
patent under her Great Seal, Her Majesty could confer legal
personality on a group of persons as a corporation. Another
illustration is the rule that Her Majesty could confer an
exclusive right on individuals to deal in specified com-
modities, commonly referred to as the granting of monop-
olies, a modern residue of which is our law of patents.
The sovereign formerly claimed authority to suspend or to
dispense with laws in individual cases. The modern survivor
of this power is the pardoning power-the prerogative of
mercy under which punishment is either cancelled or
suspended. Numerous other illustrations could be given. The
legal abilities of the soverign in this category, with their
wide policy discretions to affect or change rights, are quite
different from those in the categories of "rights" vested
in subjects as these have been analyzed.
3. Finally we have a prerogative rule that cuts across both cate-
gories already mentioned, namely, the rule that Her Majesty is
not bound by a statute unless she is named or included by
necessary intendment. She is not deprived of any claims, made
subject to any new duties, and none of her special abilities are
abridged by a statute that does not clearly do so. This rule
exempts her from statutory rules that would affect her either in
her capacity merely as a legal person or in her special capacities.
It is really therefore belongs in part in each of the two first
categories.
The legal position of Her Majesty, as so far described apart
from statute, is therefore that of a person subject to the general
rules of the common law except as varied or added to by the prerog-
ative rules. Her Majesty, of course, never could act personally in all
matters affecting her. In the sphere of activities that correspond to
the activities of subjects, agents or servants conduct her affairs. The
law applicable is the general law of agency or of master and servant
subject to some prerogative variations. In addition, in the exercise
of many of the special prerogative abilities, representatives may be
authorized to act on her behalf. The term "representatives" is used
to designate high officers of state exercising under the authority of
Her Majesty unusual prerogative abilities to distinguish them from
ordinary agents acting on behalf of Her Majesty as an ordinary legal
person. Governors of colonies, Ministers or other officers, in addition
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to being agents of Her Majesty, may be authorized as her represen-
tatives to incorporate companies or to exercise other prerogative
abilities, including, in relation specifically to colonies, the broad legis-
lative powers existing under the prerogative.
The common law position of Her Majesty has now been outlined.
Many changes have been made by, statute.
Chronologically, statutes applying to Her Majesty and her
subordinates fall into two catagories. The chronology is, to some
extent, not entirely accurate since the periods duing which these
two categories of statutes were enacted overlap. The general pattern
is, however, fairly clear.
First, statutes were passed to control' the operations of the
sovereign by restricting action without the authority of Parliament.
These statutes relate to both aspects of the sovereign's common law
position, first the sovereign's position as a person possessing claims,
powers and liberties of the same nature as any other person and,
second, restricting the special abilities conferred on the sovereign by
prerogative rules.
An example of the restriction by statute of the sovereign's
claims and powers as a person is the legislation relating to the
Consolidated Revenue Fund. Originally, revenues of the sovereign,
whether from royal estates or other "royalties" or raised by way of
taxation, all went into the sovereign's personal purse and could be
disbursed by the sovereign as he saw fit. Legislation established
a Fund and, with minor exceptions, required all the sovereign's
revenues to be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund, as it came
to be called. None of the monies could be paid out of the Fund
without the authority of Parliament by way of an appropriation
designating a specified purpose for which a specified amount might
be spent. This was a restriction on the sovereign's legal powers as
a person to dispose of his money which is removed by an appropria-
tion. 2
Similar restrictions were imposed on the sovereign's power to
alienate lands. These restrictions were of great importance in the
colonies where most wild lands were, in effect, the property of the
sovereign. A further restriction was imposed on the sovereign's
common law power to dismiss subordinates in the case of judges.
12 An appropriation by itself does not confer a right on anybody to pay-
ment of the money appropriated. It is merely a restoration of Her Majesty'spower to dispose of her money. Even where there is an appropriation and
even where Her Majesty or her authorized agent has authorized a payment
to an individual, that individual has no right to payment. He must establish
some right to payment on some other basis either contractual or statutory.Gidley v. Lord Palmerston 3 Brad. & B. 275; 129 E.R. 1290; The Queen v.Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, Law Rep. 7 Q.B. 387; Queen V.Secretary of State for War, [1891] 2 Q.B. 326; Jacques Cartier Bank v. TheQueen, 25 S.C.R. 84.
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Again, however, those restrictions were on the sovereign's powers
as a legal person under the law.
An example of a restriction imposed on a special prerogative
ability of the sovereign was a limitation placed on the power claimed
by the sovereign to requisition or take over property for defense in
time of war without paying compensation. Statutes were passed, the
effect of which was to impose conditions on the sovereign's power
to take property for these purposes. It was held that whatever the
common law prerogative may have been, the statute limited this
power so that property could be taken over only in accordance with
the conditions established by the statute.13
Second, statutes, coming, in general, somewhat later, conferred
additional rights or enabling powers on the sovereign. Taxing
statutes, once the amount of tax is fixed, operate merely to confer
new claims on the sovereign to receive monies. An enabling statute
provides for the making of regulations, for powers of decision in
particular cases and deals with other similar matters. A significant
feature of this group of statutes is that such statutory powers may
be conferred on the sovereign personally, or may be conferred
directly on subordinate officers of the sovereign or even on statutory
bodies or officers who are quite independent of the sovereign. The
result has been that the unity of the so-called executive branch of
government is gradually being destroyed. A single heirarchy with
the sovereign at the top possessing all powers and authority to
exercise them running uniformly down from the sovereign through
Ministers, lesser officers and subordinates no longer exists. Public
bodies and officers existing outside the hierarchy under the sovereign
and independently from it, may exercise powers, including subordi-
nate legislative and judicial powers. The trend towards the atomiza-
tion of the executive branch was pointed out by Maitland as long
ago as 1888.'4
The structure and general legal nature of the executive branch
of government can now be summarized.
The executive branch consists of the conduct of Her Majesty's
business as a person through agents or servants of Her Majesty.
The legal elements here are similar to those that exist in the conduct
of private persons' business through agents or servants although
some of the claims and duties of the sovereign vary from those of
the ordinary legal person under the law. Her Majesty personally
and through representatives, exercises also common law special pre-
rogative abilities and many special statutory authorities conferred
on her. In addition, certain statutory bodies and officers exercise
special authorities conferred directly on them by statute. These
bodies or officers may be classified as acting on behalf of Her Majesty
or as acting independently of the hierarchy of subordinates under
13 Attorney General v. de Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508.
14 op. cit. p. 405.
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her and as statutory persona designata, depending on the statute
conferring the authority.
.The precise problems relating to the legal forces to be found in
the executive branch of government can now be appreciated. The
Aristotelian division of the functions of government into the legis-
lative, judicial and executive functions seems to imply the existence
of clear-cut legislative, judicial and executive authorities correspond-
ing to these functions. In theory it may be possible to postulate them
in a general way. Assuming that a legal system as a mechanism for
controlling human conduct rests ultimately for its control in indivi-
dual instances on the use of some kind of community force, theoretical
definitions of these authorities can be framed. Legislative authority
in theory would be the power to decide as a matter of policy and
specify in advance the circumstances and conduct when, and the
manner in which, the community force will be used. Rules of law
are merely these statements of policy and under them the legal claim-
duty and power-liability relations arise. Judicial authority, in theory,
would be the power to determine whether the specified circumstances
have arisen and tpecified conduct taken place - the facts - and to
declare, in accordance with the previously stated policy, the action
to be taken by the community forces. Executive authority in theory
would be the power to order action by the community force. These
authorities plus the ordinary legal relations-claim-duty and power-
liability relations-seem to exhaust all the possible theoretical ele-
ments in the legal system.
These theoretical definitions of legislative, judicial and executive
authority do not, of course, accord with their practical nature and
certainly do not describe authorities exercised exclusively in the
corresponding branches of government-Parliament, the courts and
the executive. Theoretical legislative authority 'is not far out of
line with the authority exercised by Parliament and the legislatures.
They can, however, exercise certain judicial authority, as in pro-
ceedings for impeachment, and certain executive authority where
persons are imprisoned for contempt of the Houses of Parliament.
The powers of the courts in practice correspond even less to
theoretical judicial authority as they exercise authority ranging
from pure judicial authority in the theoretical sense, (on matters
which seldom come before them owing to the clarity of the legal
position) to legislative authority of greater or less extent in matters
of interpretation of statutes and refinement and development of the
common law. The courts also exercise executive authority in the
sense in which it has been defined when they order enforcement
action.
For our purposes the significant point is that the legal elements
in the executive branch of government extend far beyond the mere
exercise of the type of executive authority defined above-ordering
police, sheriffs, prison wardens or soldiers to take action under a
judicial declaration. The greater part of the operations of the execu-
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tive branch are business operations of Her Majesty corresponding to
the business activities of an individual acting through agents or
servants. Many statutory subordinate legislative and judicial authori-
ties as defined and many other authorities which, owing to the diffi-
culty of distinguishing legislative and judicial powers in practice, are
hard to classify, are exercised by officers in the executive branch. Also
it would seem that most of the domestic special abilities of Her
Majesty under the prerogative are legislative in character.15 There
is, therefore, no single authority that can be pin-pointed as exclu-
sively "executive authority" in any practical sense.
Moreover Her Majesty is not restricted in her activities to
acting solely as part of the so-called executive branch of domestic
government. She is an integral part of Parliament and the legisla-
tures in the exercise of legislative authority. She is the formal head
of the judiciary. She acts as an international sovereign and an inter-
national legal person. The prerogative rules dealing with her legal
abilities in the first two of these categories are not generally con-
sidered to be executive authorities. Her abilities in the latter cate-
gory, although from a technical point of view clearly different from
any of her domestic legal attributes, have been termed executive.
The discussion so far has been an attempt to isolate or describe
the executive branch of government and its special attributes under
our monarchial system as it existed apart from the B.N.A. Act.
Before turning to that Act a brief reference should be made to the
conditions in the pre-existing colonies. Leaving aside questions of
legislative authority, Her Majesty had an executive government
acting under her 'in each colony. Her Majesty was represented for
the exercise of her common law capacities and prerogative powers by
a governor with defined authority to act on her behalf and under
him there existed a hierarchy of officials -agents and servants -
corresponding to that already described. In addition, in each colony
statutes of the kind described, both restrictive and enabling, were
frequently passed. With the 'interposition of the Governor as her
general representative and agent, Her Majesty's executive government
in any colony corresponded to that in the unitary state directly under
Her Majesty in the United Kingdom.
In the territory of British North America therefore, prior to
Confederation three colonies-United Canada, New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia-each had separate unitary colonial governments. The
purpose of the B.N.A. Act was to weld these separate unitary colonies
into a particular type of federation with a single central government
and four separate provincial governments under Her Majesty. Prior
.5 It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a detailed classification
of the special prerogative abilities as legislative, judicial, executive or other-
,vise in their nature, if this can be done. It is submitted however that on
reflection they will, in the main, be seen to be legislative. This was clearly
true of the power to grant monopolies or to suspend or dispense with laws.
In this article we must be content with the unsupported assertion that they
are largely legislative in character.
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to the union, in each colony Her Majesty exercised her capacities as
a person under the common law, general and prerogative and her
special prerogative abilities and she was, by statute, restricted 'in some
respects and her powers in other respects were extended. She owned
property, had incurred debts and obligations, was authorized to raise
money by taxes, employed staffs of agents or servants and carried
on all operations necessary to a single government. The legal prob-
lems in detail of the union in relation to the executive branches of
her governments were therefore to place Her Majesty as a person
with her ordinary and extraordinary legal attributes appropriately
at the head of each government and to distribute Her Majesty's
assets, debts, employees, and so forth, among the new central and
provincial governments.
Provisions of the B.N.A. Act on Executive Power
The general provision already referred to is Section 9 providing
that
The Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby
declared to continue and be vested in the Queen 16
The Act then specifically provides for a considerable number of
matters affecting Her Majesty's executive operations.
By section 130 and 131, officers and servants previously employed
by the colonial governments in services to be carried on by the
federal government become officers or servants of Her Majesty in
right of Canada1 7 and provision is made for further appointments.
These Sections provide:
130. Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, all Officers
of the several Provinces having Duties to discharge in relation to
Matters other than those coming within the Classes of Subjects by this
Act asigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces shall be
Officers of Canada, and shall continue to discharge the Duties of their
respective Offices under the same Liabilities, Responsibilities, and Penal-
ties as if the Uion had not been made.
131. Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, the Gover-
nor General in Council may from Time to Time appoint such Officers as
the Governor General in Council deems necessary or proper for the
effectual Execution of this Act.
Special provision is made for the appointment of Senators, Lieutenant
Governors and Judges (with a limited power of removal). These
powers, may be considered to be executive. Curiously enough the
office of the Governor General himself is not provided for by the
statute. The office is created and appointments to it made under the
16 Section 15 provides:
The Command-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Militia and of all Naval
and Military Forces, of and in Canada, is hereby declared to continue
and be vested in the Queen.
This provision now seems to have been inserted ex abundante cautela since
the Command-in-chief of the armed forces would now seem to be included
under section 9.
17 On the use of the expression "in right of Canada", see footnote 6, supra.
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prerogative authority of Her Majesty to create offices by letters
patent and to make appointments to offices so created.
Her Majesty's revenues from taxation were to constitute two
Consolidated Revenue Funds, preserving pre-existing statutory
restrictions on Her Majesty's powers to spend money, to be appro-
priated by Parliament and the legislatures of the provinces. Section
102, 106 and 126 provide:
102. All Duties and Revenues over which the respective Legislatures
of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick before and at the Umon
had and have Power of Appropriation, except such Portions thereof as
are by this Act reserved to the respective Legislatures of the Provinces,
or are raised by them in accordance with the special Powers conferred
on them by this Act, shall form One Consolidated Revenue Fund, to be
appropriated for the Public Service of Canada in the Manner and subject
to the Charges in this Act provided.
106. Subject to the several Payments by this Act charged on the
Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada, the same shall be appropriated
by the Parliament of Canada for the Public Service.
126. Such Portions of the Duties and Revenues over which the
respective Legislatures of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick had
before the Union Power of Appropriation as are by this Act reserved
to the respective Governments or Legislatures of the Provinces, and all
Duties and Revenues raised by them in accordance with the special
Powers conferred upon them by this Act, shall in each Province form
One Consolidated Revenue Fund to be appropriated for the Public
Service of the Province.
The public lands of Her Majesty are divided, some of them to be
the property of Canada, the remainder becoming the property of the
provinces. Sections 108-9 and 117 provide:
10S. The Public Works and Property of each Province, enumerated
in the Third Schedule to this Act, shall be the Property of Canada.
109. All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the
several Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the
Union, and all Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals,
or Royalties, shall belong to the Several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec,
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise,
subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest
other than that of the Province in the same.
117. The several Provinces shall retain all their respective Public
Property not otherwise disposed of in this Act, subject to the right of
Canada to assume any lands or Public Property required for Fortifica-
tions or for the Defence of the Country. 1S
18 For the meaning to be given to the expressions "property of" and
"belong to", see the extract from St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. 'v.
The Queen quoted later in this article showing that the title is always in Her
Majesty. Section 109 has been held to have effect in two ways. First, all
lands and property actually vested in Her Majesty "belong to the province".
Second, the special prerogative claims to acquire property in the future and
which was not yet vested -rights to bona vacantia, escheats and the like -
are included in the term "royalties" and are held by Her Majesty in right of
the provinces. For illustrations (not exhaustive) of the operation of this
section, see: Attorney General of Ontario v. Mercer (1883), 8 App. Cas. 767;
St. Catherine's Milling Company 'v. The Queen (1889), 14 App. Cas 46;
Attorney-GeneraZ of British Columbia v. Attorney-GeneraZ of Canada (1889),
14 App. Cas. 295; Attorney General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Canada,
[1928] A.C. 475.
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Certain assets other than lands are also allocated. Sections 107
and 110 provide:
107. All stocks, Cash, Banker's Balances, and Securities for Moneybelonging to each Province at the Time of the Union, except as in this
Act mentioned, shall be the Property of Canada, and shall be taken in
Reduction of the Amount of the respective Debts of the Provinces at the
Union.
110. All Assets connected with such Portions of the Public Debt of
each Province as are assumed by that Province shall belong to that
Province.
Provision is also made for the assumption of pre-confederation
colonial debts by Her Majesty in right of Canada subject to certain
adjustments (Sections 111, 112, 114, 115, 116).
Provision is made for the exercise of statutory authorities con-
ferred on Her Majesty's representatives prior to the Union - the
Governor General and Lieutenant Governors, in the pre-existing
unitary colonial governments. Insofar ". . . As the same continue
in existence and capable of being exercised after the union in relation
to the Government of Canada.. ." they shall be exercisable by the
Governor General in the appropriate manner (S. 12). "The consti-
tution of Executive Authority in each of the Provinces of Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick shall, subject to the provisions of this
Act, continue as it exists at the Union until altered under the
Authority of this Act." (S. 64) Statutory authorities exercisable by
the Governors of Canada before the union ". . . shall as far as the
same are capable of being exercised after the Union in relation to
the Government of Ontario and Quebec, respectively ... be exercised
by the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario and Quebec respectively ... "
in the appropriate manner subject to being altered by the appropriate
Legislature.' 9
Unless Section 9 is treated as disposing of all of Her Majesty's
capacities and special attributes not expressly dealt with elsewhere-
the provisions of the Act are not exhaustive. By its terms this pro-
vision relates only to "Canada", the name of the new union, and it
might have been restricted to the federal government. The Maritime
Bank case 0 settled, however, that Her Majesty as a person was the
head of the provincial governments entitled to all her personal claims
-under the general common law or the prerogative-as the head of
29 These sections are limited to statutory powers conferred on Governors
and Lieutenant-Governors representing Her Majesty before Confederation.
They do not refer to special prerogative abilities or to statutory authorities
conferred on other officers. These latter were dealt with by Section 129 of the
B.N.A. Act which provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all laws in force in Canada,
Nova Scotia or New Brunswick at the Union, and all Courts of Civil and
Criminal Jurisdiction and all legal Commissions, Powers and Authorities,
and all Officers, Judicial, Administrative and Ministerial existing therein
at the Union, shall continue ... as if the Union had not been made....
subject to alteration by proper authority after the Act.
20 [1892J A.C. 437.
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the provincial governments as well as the federal government. There
remained only the question of the sovereign's special prerogative
authorities, for example, to incorporate companies or to make
treaties. The former was not expressly dealt with and did not fall
within any of the specific provisions of the Act. The latter was
probably not in contemplation. The Bonanza Creek case established
the proposition that these authorities of Her Majesty follow legisla-
tive authority. The question, in issue was whether the Lieutenant
Governor could exercise the prerogative authority to incorporate
companies. Lord Haldane states.
It is to be observed that the British North America Act has made a
distribution between the Dominion and the provinces which extends not
only to legislative but to executive authority. The executive government
and authority over Canada are primarily vested in the Sovereign. But
the statute proceeds to enact, by s. 12, that all powers, authorities, and
functions which by any Imperial statute or by any statute of the prov-
inces of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Canada, Nova Scotia, or New
Brunswick are at the Union vested in or exercisable by the respective
Governors or Lieutenant-Governors of these provinces shall, "as far as
the same continue in existence and capable of being exercised after the
Union in relation to the government of Canada," be vested in and exer-
cisable by the Governor-General. Sect. 65, on the other hand, provides
that all such powers, authorities, and functions shall, as far as the same
are capable of being exercised after the Union in relation to the govern-
ment of Ontario and Quebec respectively, be vested in and exercisable
by the Lieutenant-Governors of Ontario and Quebec respectively." By
s. 64 the constitution of the executive authority in Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick was to continue as it existed at the Union until altered under
the authority of the Act.
The effect of these sections of the British North America Act is that,
subject to certain express provisions in that Act and to the supreme
authority of the Sovereign, who delegates to the Governor-General and
through his instrumentality to the Lieutenant-Governors the exercise of
the prerogative on terms defined in their commissions, the distribution
under the new grant of executive authority in substance follows the
distribution under the new grant of legislative powers2 1
Lord Haldane goes on to discuss a further argument that full
authority to represent Her Majesty in all respects is conferred on
her Canadian representatives and concludes that it is unnecessary to
decide the question. He indicated that he held some reservations.
Since the revision in 1947 of the Letters Patent creating the office
of the Governor General which expressly gives authority in these
wide terms, presumably this question is answered at least so far as
the Governor General is concerned. 22
21 [1916) 1 A.C. 566 at 579.
22 The revised Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor
General of Canada, issued by His Majesty George VI, effective Oct. 1, 1947,
provide in Article II:
And we do hereby authorize and empower our Governor General, with
the advice of Our Privy Council for Canada or of any members thereof
or individually, as the case requires, to exercise all powers and authorities
lawfully belonging to us in respect of Canada...
Under this authority the Governor-General has a general authority as an
agent of the Sovereign and represents the Sovereign in the exercise of all
prerogatives applying to Canada, R.S.C. 1952, Vol. VI, p. 6429.
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It would now appear that, by an application of the principle of
the Bonanza Creek case, the authority to enter into treaties on behalf
of Canada is vested in Her Majesty in right of Canada. Under the
revised Letters Patent it would follow that the Governor General
could authorize such a treaty.2 3
We are now in a position to interpret fully the effect of Section
9 of the B.N.A. Act. The expression "Executive Government and
Authority" in this section covers the whole range of Her Majesty's
legal activities at common law. These include her status as a person
having legal relations with Her subjects under the general law with
prerogative variations. They include her special prerogative auth-
orities. Also it would seem they include any pre-confederation statu-
tory variation or additions.2 The term "Executive" in the expression
quoted appears to relate to her functions as head of the governments
rather than to legal powers or authorities. Although it seems likely
that in the Bonanza Creek case Lord Haldane was using the term
"executive authority" in a restricted sense and thinking only of
special prerogative authorities, The Maritime Bank case had already
made it clear that Her Majesty's personal status extended to both
governments. Broadly speaking the principle appears to be that,
where they are not expressly dealt with, Her Majesty's legal attributes
follow her practical functional activities as well as legislative auth-
ority in the spheres of the governments set up by The B.N.A. Act.
Transactions between Federal and Provincial Governments
The so-called doctrine of the "indivisibility of the Crown" calls
for no explanafion in the light of the foregoing discussion. Her
Majesty is the same person at the head of each of her two types
of governments in Canada. She acts through different hierarchies of
representatives, agents and servants but they are all acting in Her
Majesty's business.
In an Australian case, Lord Haldane stated:
The Crown is one and indivisible throughout the Empire, and it acts
in self-governing States on the initiative and advice of its own Ministersin these States. The question (in that case) is one not of property or ofprerogative in the sense of the word in which it signifies the power of
the Crown apart from statutory authority, but is one of Ministerial
administration, and this confided to the discretion in the present instance
of the same set of Ministers under both Acts."25
Lord Dunedin stated in the case of In re Silver Bros.:
It is true that there is only one Crown, but as regards Crown revenues
and Crown property by legislation assented to by the Crown there is adistinction made between the revenues and property in the Province and
the revenues and property in the Dominion. There are two separate
23 Labour Conventions Reference, [1937] A.C. 180.
24 This result would follow from s. 129 of the B.N.A. Act quoted in foot-
note 19.2 5 Theodore v. Duncan, [1919] A.C. 696, at 706. See also Williams 'v.
Howarth, [1905] A.C. 551; Attorney-General for Quebec v. Nipissing Central
Railway, [1926] A.C. 715.
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statutory purses. In each the ingathering and expending authority is
different. The case above referred to is quite on all fours with this
doctrine.26
The same view was indicated in the earlier case of St. Catherine's
Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen:
The Act of 1867 which created the Federal Government, repealed the
Act of 1840, and restored the Upper and Lower Canadas to the condition
of separate Provinces, under the titles of Ontario and Quebec, due provi-
sion being made (sect. 142) for the division between them of the property
and assets of the United Province, with the exception of certain items
specified in the fourth schedule, which are still held by them jointly.
The Act also contains careful provisions for the distribution of legislative
powers and of revenues and assets between the respective Provinces in-
cluded in the Union on the one hand, and the Dominion on the other. The
conflicting claims to the ceded territory maintained by the Dominion and
the Province of Ontario are wholly dependent upon these statutory provi-
sions. In construing these enactments, it must always be kept in view
that, wherever public land with its incidents is described as 'the property
of' or as 'belonging to' the Dominion or a Province, these expressions
merely import that the right to its beneficial use, or to its proceeds, has
been appropriated to the Dominion or the Province, as the case may be,
and is subject to the control of its legislature, and the land itself being
vested in the Crown2 7
The doctrine is firmly embedded in our domestic law and has
been the foundation of numerous transactions. Any wholesale revi-
sion of it, if proposed, would probably create widespread uncertainties.
Such a revision does not appear to be necessary and such problems as
arise under it can, as will be seen, be readily solved by departures
from orthodox views much more minbr than complete revision.
Reference will be now made to two types of transactions between
governments, first, very briefly, to so-called transfers of land between
governments, and, second, to the effect to be given agreements bet-
ween governments.
The extract quoted from the St. Catherine's Milling case shows
that lands held by the federal and provincial governments are both
vested in Her Majesty but that the administration of the lands is
carried out on her behalf through different representatives. It follows
that no conveyance of title can be made by one government to another.
Title remains throughout in Her Majesty. All that need be transferred
is the authority and duty to administer the lands on behalf of Her
Majesty. It is now well established that such a shifting of admini-
strative responsibility can be effected between governments, in the
absence of any statutory restriction, with the consent of the auth-
orized representatives of Her Majesty in both governments. Such a
transfer of responsibility was made from Imperial government to the
government of Canada by message contained in a despatch accepted
by that government.28 It is now normally done by complementary
Orders-in-Council by the Governor General and Lieutenant Governor.29
26 [1932] A.C. 514.
27 (1889), 14 App. Cas. 46.28 Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada,
[19061 A.C. 552.
29 Attorney-General of Canada v. Higbie, [1945) S.C.R. 385.
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No further conveyance is necessary nor would it be proper. Presum-
ably if a statute applied to such a transaction, limiting the authority
of either representative of Her Majesty, compliance with its terms
would be required.
The status of so-called agreements between governments gives
rise to different considerations. As indicated at the outset of this
article, since a person cannot contract with himself there can be no
contract in the strict sense between Her Majesty in one right and
Her Majesty in any other right. What then is such an agreement?
A second separate problem arises. Whatever may be the nature of
such an agreement, has any court or tribunal jurisdiction to entertain
claims in relation to it? This latter question will be dealt with first.
In the absence of special statutory provisions no court could
entertain any claim under such a so-called agreement since it cannot
in law be a contract.
The Exchequer Court Act3° provides as follows:
(1) Where the legislature of any province of Canada has passed an
Act agreeing that the Exchequer Court has jurisdiction in cases of
controversies,
(a) between Canada and such province,
(b) between such province and any other province or provinces that
have passed a like Act,
the Exchequer Court has jurisdiction to determine such controversies.
(2) An appeal lies in such cases from the Exchequer Court to the
Supreme Court.
Complementary legislation has been enacted by the Legislature
of Ontario. The Dominion Courts Act of Ontario provides:
1. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Exchequer Court of Canada,
or the Supreme Court of Canada alone, according to the Supreme Court
Act (Canada) and the Exchequer Court Act (Canada) shall have juris-
diction,
(a) in controversies between the Dominion of Canada and Ontario;
(b) in controversies between any other province of Canada in which
an Act similar to this Act is in force and Ontario.3 1
The jurisdiction so conferred has been recognized and exercised.3 2
Although many procedural problems in the course of such pro-
ceedings are unsettled, the proceedings are commenced by filing and
serving a statement of the claim and pleadings thereafter follow the
normal course. The effect of default by one government or refusal
to recognize the proceedings is unsettled.
Such an agreement may as one of its terms provide for arbitra-
tion. In such case, subject to a caveat with respect to the case where
30 R.S.C. 1952, c. 98, s. 30.
31R.S.O. 1950, c. 108, s. 1.
32 Attorney-GeneraZ of Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1910]
A.C. 637.
(VOL. 2:56
1960] Legal Nature of Federal and Provincial Executive Govts. 73
one of the parties refuses to honour the submission, the arbitral
tribunal will proceed to determine the issues.33
Assuming that proceedings, either in court or by arbitration, are
commenced and the agreement comes before the court or tribunal,
on what basis is the adjudication to be made?
The general principles appear to be settled by the Privy Council
in the case of Ontario v. Canada.34 This case did not involve an agree-
ment between governments but its decision appears to be of a general
application. The federal government claimed to recover from the
government of Ontario certain sums of money in reimbursement for
payments made to Indians under a treaty with them. There was no
pre-existing agreement but as a result of a treaty with the Indians
under which the Federal government became liable to pay for the
surrender of certain lands by the Indians, the provincial government
gained the benefit of the administration of large areas of lands owned
by Her Majesty. The claim was put forward on the basis that in fair-
ness and equity the federal government should be regarded as an
agent of the province and reimbursed. The Privy Council dismissed
the claim. Lord Loreburn L.C. states:
Their Lordships are of opinion that in order to succeed the appellants
must bring their claim within some recognized legal principle. TheCourt of Exchequer, to which, by statutes both of the Dominion and theprovince, a jurisdiction has been committed over controversies between
them, did not thereby acquire authority to determine those controversies
only according to its own view of what in the circumstances might be
thought fair. It may be that, in questions between a dominion comprising
various provinces of which the laws are not in all respects identical on
the one hand, and a particular province with laws of its own on the
other hand, difficulty will arise as to the legal principle which is to be
applied. Such conflicts may always arrive in the case of States or prov-
inces within a Union. But the conflict is between one set of legal princi-
ples and another. In the present case it does not appear to their Lordships
that the claim of the Dominion can be sustained on any principles of law
that can be invoked as applicable.
To begin with, this case ought to be regarded as if what was done by
the Crown in 1873 had been done by the Dominion Government, as in
substance it was in fact done. The Crown acts on the advice of ministers
in making treaties, and in owning public lands holds them for the good
of the community. When differences arise between the two Governmentsin regard to what is due to the Crown as maker of treaties from theCrown as owner of public lands they must be adjusted as though the
two Governments were separately invested by the Crown with its rights
and responsibilities as treaty maker and as owner respectively...
This really is a case in which expenditure independently incurred by one
party for good and sufficient reasons of his own has resulted in direct
advantage to another. It may be that, as a matter of fair play between
the two Governments, as to which their Lordships are not called upon
to express and do not express any opinion, the province ought to be liablefor some part of this outlay. But in point of law, which alone is here in
question, the judgment of the Supreme Court appears unexceptionable.
Similar principles will be applied in arbitration proceedings al-
though, of course, in such case the agreement may expressly provide
33 Saskatchewan v. Canada, [1946] 1 W.W.R. 257.
34 [1910] A.C. 637. See also Soutb AustraZia v. Victoria (1911), 12 Commw.
L.R. 667.
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that the decision of any matter in controversy shall be based on
principles of equity and fairness and that it is not required to be made
in accordance With strict principles of law. In the absence of such
a provision principles of law will be applied.w
The principles of law to be applied require some consideration.
Claims between governments may arise under statutes specifically
providing for adjustment of her Majesty's rights and authorities
between her two "statutory purses", for example the B.N.A. Act, in
which case the statutory provisions govern. 36 Where the claims arise
apart from statute and no special prerogative rule bears on the con-
troversy the general principles of the body of law proper to the con-
troversy should, it seems, be adopted. In general these principles
embody good sense and the knowledge that they will apply imports
predictability into transactions between governments. The difficult
question arises where the controversey relates to matter in which, if
it were between Her Majesty and a subject, Her Majesty would be
entitled to a prerogative exemption from liability. Can Her Majesty
in one right claim this exemption against herself in another? No
general answer can be given. In the one instance where the situation
arose, the majority of the arbitrators concluded that the prerogative
exemption set-off was founded on the basic position that a subject
can claim against Her Majesty only in proceedings by petition of
right and cannot therefore claim a set-off which is in the nature of a
cross claim. Since there is a statutory remedy between governments
that is completely mutual the claim to a set-off was allowed.37 This
instance furnishes the key to the question. The particular prerogative
exemption has to be examined in each case, its rationale appraised
and then the appropriateness of its application determined.
A further question may arise as to how far rules relating to
contracts with Her Majesty are to be imported into controversies
between Her two governments. It is not possible to do more in this
article than to indicate the problem. It arises this way. At common
law Her Majesty had full capacity to enter into contracts and peti-
tions of right could be brought for a breach of them. When statutory
restrictions were imposed on Her Majesty's power to spend her
money, a problem arose in connection with contracts under which
Her Majesty agreed to pay money. She could make no payment unless
Parliament appropriated money for the payment, that is to say,
authorized her to spend it. Did this restriction 'invalidate and render
void a contract with Her Majesty if no money was appropriated by
Parliament or did it merely mean that although the contract was
valid Her Majesty could not perform it and would commit a breach?
The subject was considered in a large number of cases and the final
view appears to have been that the contract was valid even though
35 Saskatchewan v. Canada, [1946] 1 W.W.R. 257.
36 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Mercer (1883), 3 App. Cas. 767;
Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-GeneraZ for Canada (1889),
14 App. Cas. 295.3 7 Saskatchewan v. Canada, [1946] 1 W.W.R. 257.
[VOL. 2:56
1960] Legal Nature of Federal and Provincial Executive Govts. 75
Her Majesty could not perform it.- s Of course if proceedings were
brought and a judgment was obtained there could be no enforcement
of the judgment without an appropriation by Parliament to pay it.
In Canada, under the Exchequer Court Act, there is a standing
approp;,iation to pay judgments. 39 The Financial Administration Act,
however, has in effect made statutory the contested rule that con-
tracts with Her Majesty are void unless monies are appropriated to
meet payments under them.40 Whether this provision will apply in
controversies between the governments will have to be decided. The
same question may arise with respect to other statutory provisions.
Presumably the same basic test would apply, namely, the particular
statute will have to be examined, its rationale appraised and its
application determined.
Similar questions may well arise in relation to claims between
governments founded in effect, on tort. in Australlia such an inter-
governmental liability is recognized.41
The unanswered problems of procedure in controversies between
the governments can, it is submitted, be settled in the same manner.
Once the bold step of establishing that the merits of these contro-
versies must be decided in accordance with appropriate principles of
law has been taken, it would seem to be only a minor step to hold
that the proceedings should be conducted in accordance with approp-
riate principles of procedure. Ordinary rules of procedure would
apply unless there is a ground for excluding them.
The foregoing brief sketch is intended to indicate the nature of
the problems that arise in transactions between governments. Much
remains for the courts or arbitral tribunals in developing the field.
38New South Wales v. Bardolpk (1934), 52 Commw. L.R. Starke J. at
501.3 and Dixon J. at 508 et seq. citing Kidman v. The King, [1926] Argus
L.R. 1, per Lord Haldane.
39 Exchequer Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 98, s. 79.
40 R.S.C. 1952, c. 116, s. 30 and s. 31.
41 Commonwealth of Australia v. New South Wales (1923), 32 Commw.
L.R. 200. This decision may have turned on special legislation.
